A methodology that combines verification and conformance testing for validating safety requirements of reactive systems is presented. The requirements are first automatically verified on the system's specification. Then, test cases are automatically derived from the specification and the requirements, and executed on a black-box implementation of the system. The test cases attempt to push the implementation into violating a requirement. We show that an implementation conforms to its specification if and only if it passes all the test cases generated in this way.
Introduction
Formal verification and conformance testing are two well-established methods for validating software systems. In verification [14] , a formal specification of the system is proved correct with respect to some higher-level requirements. In conformance testing [10] the external, observable traces of a black-box implementation of the system are compared to those of its formal specification, according to a conformance relation. For validating reactive systems (such as communication protocols) the two methods play complementary roles: the former ensures that the operational specification S meets its requirements R, while the latter checks that the implementation I of the system conforms to its specification S. Thus, through verification and testing, a connection between a system's final implementation and its initial requirements can be established:
1. first, satisfaction of the requirements by the specification is automatically verified, e.g., by model checking; 2. then, the user (or a test coverage tool, e.g., the TestComposer module of ObjectGeode [16] ) produces test purposes, which are abstract scenarios to be tested on the implementation I; 3. next, a test generation tool, e.g., Autolink [18] , TorX [1] or TGV [11] uses the test purposes to generate test cases from the specification; 4. finally, the test cases are executed on the implementation I, and verdicts are issued regarding its conformance with the specification.
This validation process corresponds to the current state-of-the-art use of formal methods in the telecom world [2] . The main problem with this process is that it does not guarantee that what is being tested on the implementation of the system (at Step 4) are the same requirements that have been verified to hold on the specification (at Step 1). This is because the test generation step (Step 3) uses test purposes, which are a pragmatic means (actually, an essential one) to achieve test generation; but test purposes are typically written (at Step 2) independently of the requirements, that is, there is no formal connection between the test purposes and the requirements. If some crucial safety requirement is missed by all the test purposes, the final implementation may violate that requirement, and this violation remains undetected.
In this paper we propose a methodology to integrate verification and conformance testing into a seamless, sound validation process between safety requirements, specification, and implementation. The above validation process is then reformulated as follows:
Step 1 is standard verification; Step 2 may be skipped (there is no need here to write test purposes by hand, but, of course, this is not forbidden either);
Step 3 is a test generation algorithm that takes the specification and a safety requirement, and produces a test case for checking the requirement on the implementation; and Step 4 is standard conformance test execution.
Framework. The specification is given by IOLTS (Input-Output Labeled Transition Systems, i.e., finite, labeled transition systems with inputs, outputs, and internal actions). The requirements express safety properties on observable behaviors of the specification and are described by means of a particular class of IOLTS: observers, which enter a dedicated "Violate" location when the property is violated. Finally, the conformance relation between a black-box implementation and a specification is ioco, a standard relation used in conformance testing [19] , which requires that after each visible trace of the specification, the observed outputs and blockings of the implementation are among those allowed by the specification.
Results. The meaning of requirement relevant for a specification is formally defined in the paper. We prove that an implementation conforms to a specification if and only if it satisfies all the relevant safety requirements that are also satisfied by the specification. This result is interesting because it establishes a formal connection between conformance and property satisfaction. However, it does not say how to actually check the safety requirements on the implementation. Moreover, the result is restricted to relevant requirements.
Hence, we propose a test generation algorithm, which takes a specification and a safety requirement (relevant or not), and produces a test case that, when executed on an implementation, attempts to push the implementation into violating the requirement. It is shown that an implementation conforms to a specification if and only if it passes all the test cases generated by the proposed algorithm. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the main concepts from verification and conformance testing are recalled. In Section 3, the notion of a safety property relevant to a specification is defined, and a result that connects conformance testing and satisfaction of relevant safety properties is proved. In Section 4, the previous result is extended to take into account arbitrary safety properties. This directly induces a sound and complete test generation algorithm for checking safety properties on the implementation. We conclude in Section 5. The actions in A ? ∪ A ! are also called visible actions. In the examples, a question mark placed before the name of an action (as in "?a") denotes the fact that a is an input a ∈ A ? . An exclamation mark (as in "!b") denotes an output b ∈ A ! . Internal actions are generically denoted by τ . Figure 1 describes a simple nondeterministic system. In the initial state q 0 , the system can either spontaneously emit !b and block itself waiting in state q 1 for an ?a; or directly wait for an ?a in q 0 and then, nondeterministically go to either q 2 or q 4 . In q 2 , the system may only emit !b and deadlock in q 3 , while in q 4 , !b then !c are emitted, followed by a loop of internal actions (a livelock).
Verification and Conformance Testing

Definition 1 (IOLTS). An IOLTS is a tuple
M = (Q, A, →, q 0 )
Example 1. The IOLTS depicted in
Notations and Basic Definitions
Let M = (Q, A, →, q 0 ) be an IOLTS. The notation q a → q stands for (q, a, q ) ∈→ and q a → for ∃q : q a → q . An IOLTS is sometimes identified with its initial state, i.e., we write M → for q 0 →. Let µ i ∈ A denote some actions, a i ∈ A \ I some visible actions, τ i ∈ I some internal actions, σ ∈ (A \ I) * a sequence of visible actions, q, q ∈ Q some states. 
T races(M ) T races(q 0 )) denotes the sequences of visible actions that are fireable from a state q (resp. from the initial state of the IOLTS M ).
-For q ∈ Q and a trace σ ∈ T races(q), we denote by q after σ {q ∈ Q | q σ ⇒ q } (resp. P after σ q∈P q after σ) the set of states that are reachable from the state q (resp. from the set of states P ) by sequences of actions whose projection onto visible actions is σ. -For q ∈ Q, Out(q) Γ (q) ∩ A ! is the set of fireable outputs in q. This notion is naturally extended to sets of states: for P ⊆ Q, Out(P ) q∈P Out(q). Likewise, In(q) (resp. In(P )) denote the set of fireable inputs in q ∈ Q (resp. in P ⊆ Q).
-Finally, an IOLTS M is input-complete whenever ∀q ∈ Q, In(q after ) = A ? , that is, in each state, all inputs are accepted, possibly after a sequence of internal actions (here, denotes the empty trace).
Based on the previous notations we introduce some common definitions.
Definition 2 (Deterministic IOLTS). An IOLTS
Given an arbitrary IOLTS M , one can construct a deterministic IOLTS det(M ) with the same visible behavior, i.e., T races(M ) = T races(det(M )).
Definition 3 (Determinization). The deterministic IOLTS of an IOLTS
The synchronous composition of two IOLTS performs synchronization on their common visible actions and lets them evolve independently by internal actions:
Definition 4 (Synchronous composition). Let
It is not hard to show that T races( 
Verification of Safety Properties
The verification problem considered here is : given a reactive system M and a property ψ, does M satisfy ψ (M |= ψ)? We model properties using observers, which are a particular class of IOLTS. 
Definition 5 (Observer). An observer for an IOLTS
An observer expresses the negation of a safety property on the visible behavior of a system. The Violate state is entered when the system emits an undesired output. We note that Definition 5 matches the class of Büchi automata obtained from negations of LTL safety formulas [13] , except for the self-loop on the Violate accepting state, and for the propositions labelling transitions (rather than states). Let Ω(M ) denote the (infinite) set of observers for an IOLTS M . The following definition formalizes the satisfaction of ω ∈ Ω(M ) by M :
Definition 6 (Satisfaction relation). An IOLTS M satisfies an observer ω ∈ Ω(M ), denoted S |= ω, if and only if T races(M ) ∩ L(ω) = ∅.
M |= ω holds whenever no state (q, Violate ω ) with q ∈ Q M is reachable in M ω. Figure 1 satisfies the observer ω depicted in Figure 2 . Indeed, there is no way that in S an ?a can be directly followed by !c without !b occurring in between. As these are the only traces that may lead to Violate in ω, we conclude that S |= ω.
Example 3. The IOLTS S depicted in
Conformance Testing
The goal of conformance testing is to establish whether a black-box implementation I conforms to its formal specification S. In our framework, the specification is given by an
. The implementation I is not a formal object (it is a physical system) but, in order to reason about conformance, it is necessary to assume that the behavior of I can be modeled by a formal object in the same class as the specification and having a compatible interface with it, i.e., having the same set of visible actions. Moreover, the implementation can never refuse an input from the environment (it is input-complete).
These assumptions are called test hypothesis in conformance testing [19] . Thus, the implementation is modeled by an input-complete
Quiescence: The tester observes not only responses of the implementation, but also absence of response (i.e., in a given state, the implementation does not emit any output for the tester to observe). This is called quiescence in conformance testing. There are three possible reasons for quiescence:
-A deadlock state is a state where the system cannot evolve: Γ (q) = ∅.
-An output quiescent state is a state where the system is waiting only for an input from the environment, i.e. Γ (q) ⊆ A ? . -A livelock state is a state from which the system diverges by an infinite sequence of internal actions. In the case of finite state systems that we consider, a livelock is a loop of internal actions, i.e., ∃τ 1 , .
In practice, quiescence is observed using timers : a timer is reset whenever the tester sends a stimulus to the implementation; when the timer expires, the tester observes quiescence. It is assumed that the timer is set to a value large enough such it only expires only when no response will ever occur. At the model level, however, quiescence is materialized by adding a special output action δ that manifests itself in quiescent states [19] .
Definition 7 (Suspension IOLTS). The suspension IOLTS of an IOLTS
The traces of S δ are the suspension traces of S. Fig. 1, q 3 is a deadlock, q 1 is an output-lock, and q 6 is a livelock. S δ (cf. Fig. 3 ) is obtained by adding a δ-labeled self-loop to them. Conformance relation. A conformance relation formalizes the set of implementations that behave consistently with a specification. Here, we use the classical ioco relation defined by Tretmans [19] . Intuitively, an implementation I iococonforms to its specification S, if, after each suspension trace of S, the implementation only exhibits outputs and quiescences that are possible in S. Formally:
Example 4. For S depicted in
q 2 q 1 ?a ?a q 0 !b !c τ q 6 !b ?a !b q 5 q 4 !δ q 3 !δ !δ
Definition 8 (Conformance). For IOLTS S, I such that I is interface compatible with S, I ioco S ∀σ ∈ T races(S
Remember that the black-box implementation I is assumed to be inputcomplete, but the specification S is not necessarily so. Hence, in this framework, the specification is partial with respect to inputs, i.e., after an input that is not described by the specification, the implementation may have any behavior, without violating conformance to the specification. This corresponds to the intuition that a specification models a minimal set of services that must be provided by a system. A particular implementation of the system may include more services than what is specified, but these services should not influence conformance to the specification. Figure 4 (left), which only accepts inputs ?a and emits no outputs but quiescence. For S depicted in Figure 1 , I 1 ioco S does not hold, because quiescence is not allowed initially in the suspension IOLTS S δ (Figure 3 ). On the other hand, the implementation I 2 whose suspension IOLTS is depicted in Figure 4 (right) does conform to S: the first divergence between I δ 2 and S δ is on the second input ?a in line, which does not violate conformance.
Example 5. First, consider the implementation I 1 whose suspension IOLTS is depicted in
The mechanism for testing the conformance of an implementation with its specification consists in generating test cases from the specification, and running them in parallel with the implementation to detect non-conformances between the two representations of the system. Test cases are essentially deterministic, input-complete IOLTS. In Section 4 we show how to generate test cases from the specification using observers for safety properties, in order to test both the satisfaction of the properties by the implementation and its conformance to the specification. 
Connecting Conformance and Property Satisfaction
In this section we establish a relation between conformance (I ioco S) and the satisfaction of safety properties by the specification and the implementation (S |= ω, I |= ω). Properties are expressed using observers ω ∈ Ω(S). Remember that a specification S is a partial specification in the sense defined in Section 2.3: the specification does not say what happens after an unspecified input. Hence, an observer is relevant for a specification S if it may only diverge from S by outputs: Figure 2 is not relevant for the specification S depicted in Figure 1 . This is because ω accepts arbitrarily many ?a's initially, while S accepts only one. Intuitively, ω is not relevant because it says something about behaviors that diverge from S through an unspecified input.
The set of relevant observers for M is denoted (M ).
Example 7. The observer ω depicted in
Relevant observers play an essential role in Theorem 1 below, which establishes a relation between conformance testing and property satisfaction.
To prove Theorem 1 the following technical lemma will be employed.
Theorem 1. For all IOLTS I, S: I ioco
which is clearly equivalent to
Now, consider an arbitrary relevant observer ω ∈ (S δ ). By Definition 9, all the sequences σ ∈ L(ω) are of the form σ = σ · a, where σ ∈ T races(S δ ) and a ∈ A S δ ! . Hence, the implication (1) can be rewritten equivalently as
Using Lemma 1 with
which, by Definition 6 is ∀ω ∈ (S δ ). S δ |= ω ⇒ I δ |= ω: this direction is done. (⇐) Assume ¬(Iioco S). We prove that there exists a relevant observer ω ∈ (S δ ) such that S δ |= ω but I δ |= ω. This leads to a contradiction and completes the proof. To build ω, from ¬ (I ioco S) we obtain that there exists a sequence of the form σ · a with a ∈ A
, L(ω) ∩ T races(S δ ) = ∅; and I
δ |= ω as a ∈ Out(I δ after σ) and therefore σ · a ∈ T races(I δ ) ∩ L(ω) = ∅. Hence, the observer ω is relevant for S δ , S δ |= ω, and I δ |= ω: the proof is done.✷ Interpretation. Theorem 1 can be interpreted as follows: an implementation I ioco-conforms to its specification S if, whenever S δ satisfies a relevant safety property, I δ satisfies it as well. Hence, in order to establish conformance, it is enough to prove that all relevant safety properties satisfied by the specification are also satisfied by the implementation. This is a completeness result, which is impossible to achieve in practice because there may be infinitely many relevant properties that hold on a specification.
On the other hand, Theorem 1 also says that, to detect conformance violation, it is enough to exhibit one relevant property that is satisfied by the specification, but violated by the implementation. This a soundness result and is achievable in practice. However, it does not say how to actually check the violation of the property by the implementation (the observer is not a test case, for example, it is not necessarily input-complete) and, more importantly, it is limited to properties expressed by observers that are relevant to the specification. These limitations are raised in Section 4. We conclude this section by an example showing that the relevance hypothesis is essential for Theorem 1 to hold. (Fig. 1) . For the same reason, ω is irrelevant for S δ (Fig.3) . Consider now implementation I 2 whose suspension IOLTS is depicted in Figure 4 
Example 8. Consider the observer ω, which was shown in Example 7 to be irrelevant for S
Test Generation from Safety Requirements
This section shows how to generate test cases from a specification using a safety requirement as a guide. Intuitively, such a test case guides the implementation, and attempts to "push" it into violating the requirement.
It should be clear from the previous examples that writing a relevant requirement for a given specification (in the sense of Definition 9) is not always easy. For example, the requirement expressed by the observer ω from Examples 2 to 8 is a natural (and true) property of S, but it is nevertheless irrelevant for S.
However, when an observer as a whole is irrelevant for a given specification, a subset the observer of it may still be relevant. For example, the sequence
, it is relevant for S δ in the sense of Definition 9.
Hence, we need a test generation algorithm that takes a specification S and an arbitrary requirement ω ∈ Ω(S), and automatically sorts out from ω what is relevant for S and what is not. This is done by the following operation.
Definition 10 (Forcing). Let
M = (Q M , A M , → M , q M 0 ) be a deterministic IOLTS and ω = (Q ω , A ω , → ω , q ω 0 ) an observer for M . The forcing of M by ω, denoted M ✄ω, is an IOLTS (Q ✄ , A ✄ , → ✄ , q ✄ o ) such that -the set of states Q ✄ is (Q M × Q ω ) ∪ {Violate, Fail}, where Violate, Fail / ∈ Q M × Q ω -the initial state q ✄ o is (q M o , q ω o ) -the alphabet A ✄ is A M (
same partitioning between inputs and outputs) -the transition relation → ✄ of Q ✄ is the smallest relation defined as follows. For all states (p, q) ∈ Q
✄ and action a ∈ A ✄ :
[γ]
Example 9. For the IOLTS S δ depicted in Figure 1 and ω depicted in Fig. 4 , the IOLTS det(S δ )✄ω is depicted in Figure 4 (note that ω ∈ Ω(det(S δ )). For better readability, the Violate and Fail locations have been duplicated. Note that if M is a deterministic IOLTS and ω ∈ Ω(M ), then M ✄ω is an observer for M as well, i.e., M ✄ω satisfies all the conditions of Definition 5. In particular, its language L(M ✄ω) is defined. The following lemma characterizes this language.
Lemma 2. For IOLTS M and ω
∈ Ω(M ), L(M ✄ω) = L(ω)∩[T races(M )·A M ! ].
Proof : We prove for an arbitrary sequence
First, by Definition 5, a sequence σ that belongs to either of these sets cannot be empty, because Violate cannot be the initial state of an observer. 
Lemma 2 says that M ✄ω is a relevant observer for M (it actually says that M ✄ω defines the strongest safety requirement weaker than ω and relevant for M ).
Theorem 2 below is a refinement of Theorem 1, obtained by dropping the relevance hypothesis for the observer. Its proof invokes Theorem 1 and Lemma 2.
Theorem 2. Let I and S be two IOLTS, then
Proof :(⇒) Assume I ioco S and let ω be an arbitrary observer in
Still by Lemma 2 we know that det(S δ )✄ω is a relevant observer for S δ . Then, using Theorem 1 we obtain:
, and this direction is done.
which implies I δ |= ω. We have obtained that, for all relevant observers ω ∈ (S δ ), S δ |= ω ⇒ I δ |= ω holds. By Theorem 1, we obtain I ioco S, and the proof is done. ✷ Interpretation. For observers ω that represent true safety properties of a specification S, whenever det(S δ )✄ω enters its Violate state when executed in parallel with an implementation I, then I violates both the safety property defined by ω (cf. Lemma 2) and the conformance to the specification (cf. Theorem 2).
Hence, det(S δ )✄ω is the basis for a potentially interesting test case. When it enters its Violate state, the implementation will be assigned the Violate verdict:
Violate: The implementation violates both the property and the conformance We now consider the situation when det(S δ )✄ω enters its Fail state.
Theorem 3. For IOLTS I, S and ω ∈ Ω(S
Proof : By Definition 10 line [γ], Fail ∈ (det(S δ )✄ω) after σ means that σ = σ a, where a is an output (a ∈ A ! ) which is not fireable in det(S δ ) after the sequence σ , i.e., a / ∈ Out(S δ after σ ). However, by σ ∈ T races(I δ ) we have that a ∈ Out(I δ after σ ). Then, by Definition 8, ¬(I ioco S). ✷ Interpretation. Theorem 3 says that when det(S δ )✄ω enters Fail when run on an implementation, the latter violates conformance to the specification (but not necessarily the property ω). In this case, the Fail verdict is given:
Fail: The implementation violates the conformance but not necessarily the property What remains to do is to build from det(S δ )✄ω an actual test case.
Mirror. The next step consists in transforming all inputs of det(S δ )✄ω into outputs and reciprocally. This is called the mirror operation. It is necessary because, in the test execution process, the actions of the implementation and those of the test case must complement each other.
Pruning. This operation consists in suppressing from det(S δ )✄ω the subgraphs that cannot lead to Violate. Here, the main goal of testing is to check the violation of the requirement after a trace of the specification, and, if an implementation leads a tester (extracted from the specification) into a subgraph that cannot lead to Violate, the current test experiment will never be able to achieve this goal.
There are two situations, depending on whether the subgraph (from which Violate is unreachable) was entered through an input or an output:
-the subgraph has been entered by an output of the tester. In this case, the transition labeled by that output (together with the whole subgraph), are removed. Intuitively, the tester has control over its outputs, thus, it may decide not to stimulate the implementation with an output if it knows that this will never lead to a Violate verdict. -the subgraph has been entered by an input of the tester (that does not directly lead to Fail). In this case, only the transition labeled by that input is kept (the rest of the graph is removed). The destination of the transition is set to a new state called Inconc, which means that no Violate verdict can be given any more (but the conformance was not violated). Hence, for completeness, in this situation the verdict will be Inconc (inconclusive). 
Conclusion, Related Work, and Future Work
We now recall the framework proposed in the paper and the main results obtained. A system is viewed at three different levels of abstraction: high-level requirements R, operational specification S, and final, black-box implementation I. In the proposed framework, all three views are modeled using Input-Output Labeled transition systems, which are labeled transition systems whose actions are partitioned into inputs, outputs, and internal actions.
The conformance relation ioco [19] links I and S, and the satisfaction relation |= links S (or I) and requirements R. A notion of requirement that is relevant for a specification is defined, which essentially means that the requirement does not refer to features that are not incorporated into the specification.
Our first result says intuitively that I ioco-conforms to S if and only if I satisfies all relevant requirements that are satisfied by S. While it is interesting from a theoretical point of view, because it gives an alternative definition of iococonformance, this result is not practical as it is restricted to relevant requirements (which are not always easy to come up with) and it does not say how to actually check a requirement on a black-box implementation. This can be done by testing, and therefore we propose a test generation algorithm that takes an IOLTS specification S, and an arbitrary requirement ω (relevant or not) expressed using specific IOLTS called observers, and produces an IOLTS test case, denoted test(S, ω). The tester emits verdicts: Violate, Fail, and Inconc, which express relations between I, S, and R.
Our second result says intuitively that I ioco S holds if and only if, for all observers ω that express true properties of the specification S, by executing test(S, ω) in parallel with the implementation I, the Violate verdict is not obtained.
The "only if" part of this result is a theoretical completeness result: in order to establish conformance, an infinite number of test cases should be executed, and each execution is a potentially infinite process as well.
More interesting in practice is the "if" part of the result, which is a soundness property. Going back to the validation approach proposed in Section 1, it implies that every requirement that holds on the specification allows to automatically generate a test case to check the requirement on the implementation as well.
A similar soundness result holds for the Fail verdict, which says that, if the Fail verdict is obtained by executing test(S, ω) in parallel with the implementation I, then I ioco S does not hold. The Fail verdict plays the role of a warning in the proposed validation process: when it is issued, the implementation has violated conformance to the specification, and the trace that led to this violation can be examined to check whether this corresponds to a serious problem or not.
Finally, an Inconc (inconclusive) verdict means that the current test experiment will never be able to detect the violation of a requirement in the future, therefore, the user may stop the current test experiment and start another one.
Related Work. There exists a lot of interest in formal verification from researchers and, recently, formal verification has started to penetrate the industry. More recently, conformance testing (and other forms of testing) have become a topic of interest to the verification community. This has resulted in new algorithms and tools for testing based on verification technology (mainly model checking) [1, 4, 11, 18] .
In [6] the authors describe an approach to generate tests from observers describing linear-time temporal logic requirements and to execute the tests directly on the implementation. This is similar to what we do, except for the logic and one more important point: [6] does not require verification of the property on the specification prior to conformance testing, and the test cases do not check conformance, but only that the implementation does not violate the requirements.
The authors of [15] have ideas similar to ours. Given a specification S, and an invariant P assumed to be satisfied by S, mutants S of S are built using standard mutation operators. Then, a combined machine is generated, which extends sequences of S with sequences of S . Next, the SMV model-checker is used to generate sequences that violate P , i.e., sequences that prove that S is a mutant of S violating P . Finally, the sequences are interpreted as test cases. The construction of the combined machine is quite similar to our forcing operation (with S interpreted as ω). Several other papers, like [7, 5] , start from a specification S and a property P in a temporal logic (CTL or LTL) satisfied by S, and use the counter-example facility of a model checker (SMV, SPIN) to generate counter-examples of ¬P , thus, witnesses of P in S. Some papers like [8] extend the idea to describe coverage criteria in temporal logic and generate test cases using model-checking.
However, all these papers suffer from the same drawbacks. They do not take nondeterminism into account, do not differentiate between inputs and outputs, and do not formally define conformance testing. Moreover, except [15] , they do not relate satisfaction of properties to conformance testing.
In [17] another approach to combine test selection and verification is presented. The idea is to use symbolic test selection techniques to extract test cases from a specification, which, under some sufficient conditions, can be used to perform a compositional verification of the requirements. However, the test selection mechanism is not related to the requirements in a formal way, as it is in this paper.
Future work. In the near future we are planning to implement the test generation method for safety properties presented here in the TGV tool [11] . TGV uses test purposes as test selection mechanisms, which express reachability properties of the specification; a test case is generated for every witness (trace) showing that the specification satisfies a given reachability property [11] . Thus, to perform test generation from safety properties, it is not enough to take the negation of a safety property, and use TGV with the resulting reachability property as a test purpose: if the specification satisfies the safety property (as assumed everywhere in this paper), its negation has no witnesses, thus, TGV produces an empty test case.
Our symbolic test generation tool STG [4] , based on abstract interpretation rather than enumeration, is another target for the new test generation algorithm.
We are also planning to extend this framework to LTL safety formulas [13] by a translation of LTL formulas on observable events into observers, and connect this work with that of [9, 3] . The problem addressed by these papers is to check whether temporal logic formulas expressing safety requirements have a sufficient coverage of the specification. Here, coverage is defined by the ability of a formula to distinguish mutants. Thus, if a set of requirements has a good coverage of the specification, the test cases obtained by our method may have a good coverage on implementations, thus, a good chance of finding bugs during test execution.
Finally, in this paper the situation where the specification does not satisfy the requirements has not been considered. We are currently investigating an approach based on previous work [12] for automatically computing the largest specification contained in the original specification, which satisfies the requirements and does not change the set of implementations that conform to the original specification.
